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CFO cultural background and stock price crash risk
Abstract
We investigate the relation between the cultural background of chief financial officers (CFOs) 
and stock price crash risk. Using a novel single-country setting in the U.K. market, we find 
robust evidence that CFOs from cultural backgrounds that emphasise uncertainty avoidance 
are negatively associated with firms’ stock price crash risk. Our evidence further shows that 
the effect of CFO uncertainty avoidance is more pronounced for firms with higher 
information asymmetry and riskiness, and when CFOs have a greater ability to influence firm 
decisions. Overall, the results shed light on the important role of CFO cultural background for 
firm policies and outcomes.
Keywords: Managerial cultural background, Uncertainty avoidance, Stock price crash risk
JEL Classification: G10, G12, G14
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1. Introduction
Stock price crash risk, which measures asymmetry in the return distribution, 
especially downside risk, is a fundamental issue in the asset pricing literature. It has received 
increasing attention from the media and regulators since the 2008 financial crisis. Given that 
extreme bad cases can lead to non-negligible losses for investors, examining the determinants 
of stock price crash risk is crucial. There is a vast prior literature that has documented how 
firm-level characteristics are attributable to variations in price crash risk. However, few 
studies have explored the impact of managers’ idiosyncratic characteristics, which are an 
important factor (Andreou et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2016b). Among those, cultural aspects 
have generally been underexplored, and this paper aims to fill that void in the literature. 
Specifically, we investigate whether and how the cultural background of chief financial 
officers (CFOs) affects future stock price crash risk.
This study is motivated by upper echelons theory, which argues that the top 
management team’s background characteristics are key predictors of organisational 
behaviours and outcomes (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
document that top managers have statistically and economically significant effects on 
corporate behaviour. Furthermore, prior literature (e.g., Brochet et al., 2018; Du et al., 2017; 
Nguyen et al., 2018) has confirmed that cultural background has a significant influence on 
corporate decisions and outcomes (e.g., analysts’ forecasting accuracy), information 
disclosure, and firm performance under pressure. In this study, we focus on the uncertainty 
avoidance index (UAI) in Hofstede et al.’s (2010) cultural dimensions. Prior research 
suggests that, among Hofstede’s six cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance most strongly 
affects corporate financial decisions (e.g., Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Kanagaretnam et al., 
2014; Nguyen and Truong, 2013; Pan et al., 2017). Thus, we believe it is the most relevant 
cultural dimension for our study.
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According to the agency theoretic framework, price crash risk arises from the 
information asymmetry between corporate insiders and external stakeholders (Jin and Myers, 
2006). Managers may hoard bad news for various reasons, but their ability to do so is limited. 
Therefore, when the accumulation of bad information passes a certain threshold, it will be 
revealed to the market all at once, leading to a stock price crash. Following Jin and Myers 
(2006), we propose that managers with different cultural values inherited from their ancestors 
may have different attitudes toward exploiting information asymmetries (i.e., withholding 
negative information from shareholders). 
Uncertainty avoidance, which captures a society’s tolerance for uncertainty and 
ambiguity, provides an interesting link to our research question. According to Hofstede et al. 
(2010), individuals with strong uncertainty avoidance will try to control the future and 
maintain rigid codes of belief and behaviour. We expect that executives with strong 
uncertainty avoidance will prefer to avoid future uncertainty and ambiguity for their firms, 
and will therefore be less likely to hoard, and more likely to reveal, up-to-date bad news to 
the public. As a result, we hypothesise that firms whose executives have stronger uncertainty 
avoidance cultural backgrounds will experience lower stock price crash risk. 
To examine our hypothesis, we first use a novel single-country setting, which allows 
us to investigate cross-country cultural impacts without the correlated omitted country-level 
factors, such as economic conditions, dominant religions, legal origins, and governance 
quality. The U.K. market provides an ideal context, because U.K. firms have high proportions 
of foreign executives with diverse nationalities (Conyon et al., 2018), thus enabling us to 
investigate the cultural background of executives directly. Second, we focus on CFOs instead 
of CEOs. This is because CFOs’ duties are primarily financial, and they are responsible for 
reporting accurate and timely financial information (Ham et al., 2017). Kim et al. (2011) 
argue that CFOs have more financial expertise and a greater influence over firms’ financial 
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decisions than CEOs. In addition, examining the impact of CFO cultural background in U.K. 
firms is especially relevant because, in the U.K., CEOs tend to be less powerful than in the 
U.S. (Keenan, 2004; Aguilera et al., 2006).1 CFOs in the U.K. are also more likely to play a 
more significant role in their firms than those in the U.S. (Florackis and Sainani, 2018).2
We construct a sample of public firms that are constituents of the FTSE All-Share 
Index between 1999 and 2015. This sample is representative, capturing approximately 98% 
of the U.K.’s market capitalisation. We obtain data from three main sources: BoardEx, 
Datastream, and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. The final sample consists of 703 unique 
firms, 1,340 unique CFOs, and 6,531 firm-year observations, and contains 106 unique foreign 
CFOs (426 firm-years with non-U.K. CFOs) from 17 countries.
We present several important findings. First, our main results reveal a negative and 
significant relation between CFO uncertainty avoidance and firm-level stock price crash risk, 
consistent with our expectation that the uncertainty avoidance tendency embedded in CFO 
cultural background affects the risk of future stock price crashes. Our results are robust to 
controlling for CEOs’ and board of directors’ cultural backgrounds as well as addressing 
endogenous concerns using firm fixed effects regression models, a difference-in-differences 
specification, and a propensity score matching procedure.
Second, in additional analyses, we explore the potential channels of how CFO cultural 
background affects stock price crash risk. Specifically, we find that the effect of CFO 
uncertainty avoidance on crash risk is more pronounced when firms have more severe 
information asymmetry (i.e., lower analyst following, higher bid-ask spreads, lower financial 
statement comparability). This suggests that CFO uncertainty avoidance background may 
1 Keenan (2004) finds that the same person holds both the chairman and CEO titles in approximately 75% of 
S&P 500 companies in the U.S. In contrast, such CEO duality is very rare in U.K. companies. Aguilera et al. 
(2006) highlight that a CEO’s exercise of power may be further constrained according to Higg’s (2003) review.
2 Florackis and Sainani (2018) find that U.K. CFOs are perceived to play a more important strategic role 
because 85% of them sit on the board of directors in their firms, while only 11% of U.S. CFOs hold board 
positions.
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help reduce crash risk through decreasing bad news hoarding behaviour (e.g., less opaque 
financial reporting). We also find that the effect of CFO uncertainty avoidance on crash risk 
is more pronounced when firms have higher risk (i.e., higher cash flow volatility, earnings 
volatility, return volatility, and expected default frequency). This suggests that CFO 
uncertainty avoidance background could help reduce crash risk through decreasing potential 
bad news (e.g., less risky investments).
Third, in robustness tests, we find that the effect of CFO uncertainty avoidance on 
stock price crash risk is particularly important when CFOs have a greater ability to influence 
firm decisions (i.e., older CFOs, and CFOs with higher relative pay). This provides further 
support for the importance of CFO cultural background to firms’ policies and outcomes. 
Additionally, we find that our results hold after controlling for additional factors, including 
executive characteristics (age, tenure, and gender of CEOs and CFOs), financial reporting 
features (earnings management and accounting conservatism), corporate governance 
characteristics (CEO duality, board size, and proportion of independent directors), CFO 
equity incentives, firm internationalisation (percentage of foreign sales and percentage of 
foreign directors), the largest percentage of foreign CFOs (American), and the effect of 
foreignness (foreign CFO indicator).
This paper provides several important contributions to the extant literature. First, we 
add to the literature on price crash risk by identifying an additional and important determinant: 
CFO cultural background. This area has been underexplored in prior literature. Second, we 
contribute to the literature on executive characteristics and upper echelons theory by 
documenting that executives’ cultural values, especially uncertainty avoidance, affect 
corporate decisions and outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
investigate the relationship between cultural dimension and price crash risk at a firm level. 
Third, we contribute to the previously overlooked literature on the effect of CFOs by 
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documenting their outsize importance in corporate financial decisions and outcomes, even 
beyond that of CEOs. Uhde, Klarner, and Tuschke (2017) note that CFOs play an 
increasingly influential role at the top of firms, but relevant studies remain scarce and 
fragmented. We provide additional evidence about the roles of CEOs and CFOs in the U.K. 
(Aguilera et al., 2006; Florackis and Sainani, 2018; Keenan, 2004). Last, we extend previous 
cross-country cultural literature by documenting the managerial cultural effect in a novel 
single-country setting. This enables a better statistical identification of the relation between 
CFOs’ cultural background and stock price crash risk by mitigating the concerns of country-
level omitted factors. It also highlights a valuable implication that managerial cultural 
background is relevant even for managers working in the same country. Ultimately, our paper 
shows that CFO cultural background is a central and essential factor that should not be 
neglected in capital markets.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview 
of the relevant literature and presents our hypothesis. Section 3 discusses our data and 
methodology, while section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature and hypothesis development
2.1. Price crash risk
The mechanism of corporate stock price crash risk is based on the argument that 
managers tend to hoard negative information over an extended period, allowing it to 
accumulate. If managers withhold negative information successfully, the distribution of stock 
returns should be more negatively skewed (Callen and Fang, 2015; Chen et al., 2001; Hutton 
et al., 2009). However, when the stockpile of negative news reaches a certain threshold, it is 
released to the market all at once, leading to a sharp price decrease. The agency theoretic 
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framework proposed by Jin and Myers (2006) suggests that crash risk can be caused by the 
existence of information asymmetries between corporate insiders and external stakeholders. 
Several streams of literature have investigated the potential determinants of crash risk 
(Habib et al., 2018). First, specific signals from capital markets, such as trading volume as 
investigated in Chen et al. (2001), and stock liquidity as examined in Chang et al. (2017), can 
predict future crash risk. 
Second, crash risk is found to be closely related to the quality of the corporate 
governance mechanism. For example, Andreou et al. (2016) find that ownership structure, 
accounting opacity, board structure, and managerial incentives can explain price crash risk. 
Empirical studies also find that analyst coverage affects firm-specific crash risk (Xu et al., 
2013; Xu et al., 2017). 
Third, informal institutional mechanisms can explain future crash risk. Lee and Wang 
(2017) find that political connections of directors affect stock price crash risk in China. 
Callen and Fang (2015) document that religion affects crash risk when looking at firms 
headquartered in different U.S. counties.
Fourth, prior studies suggest that managers’ idiosyncratic characteristics may shape 
their decisions on withholding bad news. For example, Kim et al. (2016b) show that CEO 
overconfidence is an important factor in future crash risk because overconfident CEOs are 
more likely to overestimate future cash flows and undertake negative net present value 
projects. Andreou et al. (2017) document a negative relationship between CEO age and stock 
price crash risk. They posit that CEOs have greater financial incentives to hoard bad news in 
their earlier careers. This stream of the literature is more closely related to our setting for 
investigating the determinants of stock price crash risk. 
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2.2. Chief financial officers (CFOs)
A seminal study in business and management by Dearborn and Simon (1958) 
recognises the importance of top managers to firms’ value-generating activities. It concludes 
that managers exhibit comprehensive differences in attitudes, knowledge, and perspectives, 
stemming mainly from differences in their functional backgrounds, which can lead to widely 
varying strategic decisions. Hambrick and Mason (1984), building on Dearborn and Simon’s 
(1958) work, develop the upper echelons theory, which states that the top management 
team’s background characteristics are key predictors of organisational behaviours and 
outcomes. Decision-making in organisations is complicated by uncertainty, ambiguity, and 
competing goals. Top managers will use their cognitive biases and values to filter information, 
assess situations, and make strategic decisions. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) further document 
that top managers have statistically and economically significant effects on corporate 
decisions.
However, empirical studies thus far have focused primarily on the effect of CEOs, 
with the implicit assumption that power and key decision-making authority are concentrated 
in their hands (Herrmann and Datta, 2002). There has been only limited research into whether 
and how CFOs influence corporate decisions, although that has begun to change, with some 
recent studies recognising the vital role of CFOs. Ham et al. (2017), for example, note that 
CFOs are responsible for the accuracy and timeliness of firm financial disclosures, and 
therefore have the greatest share of firm financial duties. Ge et al. (2011) find that CFO fixed 
effects can explain a range of accounting practices, such as operating lease classifications, 
discretionary accruals, and earnings smoothing. More importantly, they find little evidence 
linking CFO fixed effects to standard demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, or 
education, and conclude it is likely that more subtle personality attributes are at play. 
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These two studies are closely tied to our research question, because the influence of 
CFO personality on accurate and timely information disclosures leads to variations in firms’ 
stock price crash risk. Therefore, our study complements both Ham et al. (2017) and Ge et al. 
(2011) by highlighting CFO cultural background as one of the subtle but important personal 
features that affect CFO financial decisions.
2.3. Cultural characteristics
An emerging literature has documented the significant influence of culture on 
corporate decisions and outcomes, such as analysts’ forecasting accuracy, information 
disclosures and corresponding market responses, and firm performance under pressure. Du et 
al. (2017) use individual ethnicity as a proxy for culture. They find supportive evidence for 
the effect of cultural proximity on information asymmetry in financial markets, which 
highlights its importance as a component of human capital. Brochet et al. (2018) show that 
managers’ ethnic backgrounds can affect how they communicate with investors and how the 
market responds to the disclosure event. Furthermore, Nguyen et al. (2018) present evidence 
that CEOs’ cultural heritage affects U.S. bank performance under competitive pressure. They 
attribute the effect to the wide variety of cultural values that represent a CEO’s ancestral 
country of origin. 
Liu (2015) documents that CEO cultural origin is an economically important 
determinant of CEO incentives, which dominates other CEO-specific factors such as birth 
year, gender, education, MBA degree, selective college, and military experience. This 
indicates that managerial cultural background is a key feature with an incremental effect that 
is above and beyond other managerial characteristics.
Prior literature has also analysed the role of uncertainty avoidance in business. Kwok 
and Tadesse (2006) test how uncertainty avoidance affects individuals’ investment 
preferences. Using cross-country analysis, they find that countries with stronger uncertainty 
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avoidance tend to have a more risk-averse market-based financial system. Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2014) find that uncertainty avoidance affects accounting conservatism and risk-taking in the 
banking industry. Specifically, banks in countries with stronger uncertainty avoidance tend to 
be less risk-taking, and more conservative in their earnings reports. Using a firm-level 
analysis, Pan et al. (2017) find that CEOs with stronger uncertainty avoidance are less likely 
to undertake acquisitions and R&D investments. Given the important influence of culture, 
especially uncertainty avoidance, in financial markets, it is worth examining whether this 
aspect of executives affects crash risk. 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions have been widely used in multi-country cultural 
studies, but, in this paper, we examine a single-country setting. We thus avoid the problem of 
correlated omitted variables, such as economic conditions, dominant religions, legal origins, 
and governance quality. Previous literature (Conyon et al., 2018) has found that U.K. firms 
have higher proportions of foreign executives with more diverse nationalities than firms in 
other countries such as the U.S. Accordingly, we choose to focus on U.K. firms, and conduct 
our analyses of the cultural background of foreign executives directly at a firm level.
Following Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) and Pan et al. (2017), we measure uncertainty 
avoidance using Hofstede et al.’s (2010) UAI, which captures a society’s tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity. That is, individuals with a strong UAI will try to control the future 
and maintain more rigid codes of belief and behaviour. CFOs with a strong UAI may prefer 
to avoid future uncertainty and ambiguity for their firms. A stronger UAI would also reflect a 
society with stronger formalised rules and established group norms for the purpose of 
ensuring stability, resulting in less room for individual discretion (Mahajan and Toh, 2017; 
Randolph and Sashkin, 2002). 
Nadler and Breuer (2017) further suggest that a culture of uncertainty avoidance may 
affect individual risk preference (e.g., Hens and Wang, 2007) or ambiguity preference (e.g., 
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Chui and Kwok, 2008), or perhaps both. In other words, CFOs with stronger UAI may be 
more risk averse, so they may follow more conservative corporate policies with less risky 
projects. They may also be more ambiguity averse, and therefore more willing to reveal, and 
less likely to hoard, up-to-date bad news. Both of these effects could lead to lower stock price 
crash risk. Thus, our hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Firms with CFOs who have stronger UAI will experience lower price crash 
risk.
3. Data and variables
3.1. Data
Our data come from three main sources. Executive characteristics and corporate 
governance variables are obtained from BoardEx (any missing executive nationality is 
manually collected from FAME). Firm-level data, including return index, firm revenues, and 
accounting data, are derived from Datastream. UAI is obtained from Hofstede et al. (2010).
The sample consists of the constituents of the FTSE All-Share Index during the 1999-
2015 period. This index captures 98% of the U.K.’s market capitalisation, and is comprised 
of all the constituents of the FTSE 100, the FTSE 250, and the FTSE Small Cap Indexes. We 
collect the return index on these firms from Datastream, and calculate weekly stock returns 
for all individual firms. We follow Ince and Porter (2006) and An et al. (2018) in screening 
and correcting the return index. In particular, we set a return index as missing if it is less than 
0.01, and we exclude the observation if the return index exceeds 200% and reverses in one 
week. We truncate the absolute value of unusually high weekly returns at 0.5. 
We then filter the sample by: 1) winsorising the firm-level variables at the 1st and 
99th percentiles in order to eliminate potential outlier effects, and 2) excluding any firms with 
less than 26 weekly observations in a given year. The final sample consists of 703 firms, 
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1,340 CFOs, and 6,351 firm-years, and contains 106 unique foreign CFOs (426 firm-years 
with non-U.K. CFOs) from 17 countries. Table 1 shows that the CFOs with the strongest and 
weakest UAI are from France (0.86) and Singapore (0.08), respectively. 
[Insert Table 1 here]
3.2. Model specification
To investigate whether CFO UAI affects future stock price crash risk, we use the 
following pooled OLS regression model in our empirical analyses:3
𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝐾∑
𝑘 = 1𝛾𝑘 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (1)
where  is measured by the variables , , and , which 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿
we elaborate on in the next subsection.  is determined by the nationality of the CFO. 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
Following prior literature,  includes control variables on investor belief 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿
heterogeneity, stock historical performance, and firm characteristics. Definitions of the main 
variables are in Appendix A. A set of year time dummies is included to capture the effects of 
macroeconomic shocks, and a set of industry dummies is included to capture interindustry 
differences in the demand for executive talent. In addition, we apply lead-lag regressions to 
reduce issues related to reverse causality.
3.3. Stock price crash risk
To measure stock price crash risk, we follow Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. 
(2011). We use weekly returns within one fiscal year for each firm to estimate firm-specific 
weekly returns. First, we estimate the following regression model:
3 We also test for the likelihood of a quadratic relation between CFO UAI and crash risk by simultaneously 
including  and its square in the same regression. Corresponding results are shown in Table A1 in the 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
Online Appendix. From these results, we find no evidence of a quadratic relation, since both the coefficient on 
 and the coefficient on its square are statistically insignificant. It is thus more likely that  will 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
linearly affect stock price crash risk, but unlikely that a CFO will have a retroactive influence on crash risk due 
to having a cultural background that overemphasises UAI.
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𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡 ‒ 2 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 1 + 𝛽5𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2)
where  is the return on an individual stock  in week , and  is the return on the FTSE 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 𝑖 𝑡 𝑟𝑚,𝑡
All-Share Index in week . Lead and lag returns for the market are included to allow for non-𝑡
synchronous trading (Dimson, 1979). The residual term from the above regression model is 
used to calculate firm-specific weekly returns ( ):𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = ln (1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡) (3)
We use three measures to proxy for stock price crash risk. The first,  is based 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇,
on the number of firm-specific weekly returns exceeding 3.20 standard deviations above and 
below the mean firm-specific weekly return over the fiscal year, taking the downside minus 
the upside frequencies.
The second,  is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns, and 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊,
is calculated by dividing the negative of the third moment of the firm-specific weekly returns 
in a fiscal year by the standard deviation of those returns raised to the third power:
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊 =‒ 𝑁(𝑁 ‒ 1)32∑𝑊 3𝑖,𝑡(𝑁 ‒ 1)(𝑁 ‒ 2)(∑𝑊 2𝑖,𝑡)32 (4)
where  is the number of firm-specific weekly returns of firm  in a fiscal year.𝑁 𝑖
The third, , measures the down-to-up volatility of firm-specific weekly returns 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿
by dividing all the weeks in a fiscal year into two groups: down-weeks with firm-specific 
weekly returns below the annual mean, and up-weeks with firm-specific weekly returns 
above the annual mean.  is then calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿
standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns in down-weeks to that in up-weeks, as 
follows:
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𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿 = ln ((𝑁𝑈 ‒ 1)∑𝑊 2𝑖𝐷,𝑡(𝑁𝐷 ‒ 1)∑𝑊 2𝑖𝑈,𝑡) (5)
where  is firm ’s firm-specific weekly return in a down-/up-week, and  is 𝑊𝑖𝐷,𝑡/𝑊𝑖𝑈,𝑡 𝑖 𝑁𝐷/𝑁𝑈
the number of down-/up-weeks in a fiscal year.
All three proxies provide indications of the asymmetry of firm-specific weekly returns. 
Higher values of , , and  indicate higher levels of crash risk.𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿
3.4. CFO uncertainty avoidance background
To measure CFO uncertainty avoidance background, we follow prior literature (e.g., 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2014), and use the uncertainty avoidance index from Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions to assign scores based on CFO nationality. As we noted earlier, we obtain CFO 
nationality data from BoardEx, and we manually collect any missing data from FAME.
One caveat is that our empirical measure of CFO cultural background depends on 
nationality, which is prone to measurement error. For example, CFO nationality may differ 
from CFO birth country. We therefore test the validity of our measure by comparing our 
nationality measure to the manually collected CFO birthplace information from 
“Ancestry.com” for a subsample of FTSE 350 firms across our sample period. We are able to 
find the birthplace for 68% of CFOs for FTSE 350 firms. Among these, only 3% had a 
different nationality from birth country, indicating that our nationality measure is largely 
accurate. Using birthplace leads to a huge loss in available observations, but CFO nationality 
matches birthplace in most cases. Therefore, we believe the nationality measure is the best 
available measure to capture CFO cultural background. 
3.5. Control variables
Following prior research on price crash risk (Andreou et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2001; 
DeFond et al., 2015; Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2016a), we include the 
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following control variables in regression models. To control for investor belief heterogeneity, 
we include the detrended stock trading volume ( ) to measure difference of opinion 𝛥𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁
among investors. To control for the potential persistence of the third moment of stock returns, 
and address concerns about dynamic endogeneity, we use the lag value of the negative 
skewness of past firm-specific stock returns ( ). Given that stocks with higher past 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊
returns and higher volatilities have a higher potential of experiencing crashes, we include the 
average and the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns (  and ) over 𝑅𝐸𝑇 𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝑅𝐸𝑇
the previous year in the regression. We also control for various firm fundamental 
characteristics: firm size ( ), which is the natural logarithm of a firm’s market 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸
capitalisation; market-to-book ratio ( ); financial leverage ( ), which is the ratio of 𝑀𝑇𝐵 𝐿𝐸𝑉
long-term debt to total assets; and return on assets ( ).𝑅𝑂𝐴
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive summary
Table 2, panel A, presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables in our study. 
The mean values of , , and  are −0.049, −0.048, and −0.057, 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿
respectively, which are similar to those found in prior price crash risk studies (e.g., Chen et 
al., 2017). The firm-level characteristics are also consistent with those in prior studies based 
on the U.K. market (e.g., Conyon et al., 2018). 
[Insert Table 2 here]
Table 2, panel B, shows the correlation matrix. All three proxies of price crash risk 
are highly positively correlated, confirming that they are able to capture the most common 
aspects. 
Figure 1 presents the initial evidence for how different proxies of price crash risk 
change around the CFO turnover event. Panel A shows that, if the incoming CFO has a 
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stronger UAI than the incumbent CFO, crash risk will generally decrease after the turnover. 
Consistently, panel B shows that a firm will suffer higher crash risk if the incoming CFO has 
a weaker UAI than the incumbent CFO. Both panels indicate that stronger CFO UAI is 
associated with lower price crash risk, supporting our hypothesis. In the next subsection, we 
investigate how CFO UAI affects future stock price crash risk through regression models.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
4.2. Main results
Table 3 presents the OLS regression results of stock price crash risk on CFO UAI. We 
use , , and  as dependent variables in columns (1) to (3), 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿
respectively. The results reveal that stronger  is associated with lower future stock 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
price crash risk.4 
To elaborate, in model 1, the coefficient on  is −0.329, with a t-statistic of 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
−2.51. With respect to economic significance, the effect of a one standard deviation (0.049) 
increase in  leads to a  decrease in . In model 2, the 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 0.329 × 0.049 = 0.016 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇
coefficient on  is −0.504 with a t-statistic of −2.85, indicating that, on average, 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
increasing  by one standard deviation (0.049) will decrease  by 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊
. In model 3, the coefficient on  is −0.350 with a t-statistic 0.504 × 0.049 = 0.024 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
of −3.12. This indicates that a one standard deviation increase in  leads to a 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
decrease in  of . Taken together, firms with CFOs who have 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿 0.350 × 0.049 = 0.017
stronger UAI experience lower crash risk in the following year, which is consistent with our 
hypothesis.
[Insert Table 3 here]
4 Results are qualitatively consistent if we focus instead on a small sample of firms with only non-U.K. CFOs 
(426 year-firm observations).
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4.3. CEOs’ and board of directors’ cultural backgrounds
Thus far, our empirical results confirm that CFOs play an important role in corporate 
decisions and outcomes. However, previous literature has suggested that CEO characteristics 
significantly influence price crash risk. For example, Kim et al. (2016b) note that 
overconfident CEOs positively affect stock price crash risk. Andreou et al. (2017) find that 
CEO age is negatively related to future price crash risk. In addition, we consider the board of 
directors’ cultural backgrounds, because previous literature has shown that board 
characteristics can affect firm outcomes (e.g., Erhardt et al., 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; 
Walt and Ingley, 2003). Therefore, it is crucial to investigate whether the cultural background 
of CEOs or the board has a similar impact, and whether the effect of CFOs’ uncertainty 
avoidance tendency is incremental to that of CEOs and boards. 
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 4 present our regression results by including , 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
, and  in the same regression model.5 The results reveal that the effect 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑈𝐴𝐼
of  on different measures of stock price crash risk remains significant (at least at a 5% 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
level) after taking  and  into consideration. We fail to find any 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑈𝐴𝐼
significant relation between  and stock price crash risk, and we only detect a 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
marginal relation between  and stock price crash risk (significant at a 10% level 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑈𝐴𝐼
only in column (3)). Overall,  dominates  and  in affecting 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑈𝐴𝐼
stock price crash risk. The insignificant influence of CEOs on financial outcomes in U.K. 
firms may be attributable to the fact that they tend to be less powerful in U.K. than in U.S. 
firms (Keenan, 2004; Aguilera et al., 2006). Furthermore, the finding that CFOs play a more 
5 Our main results hold even if we also control for: 1) the UAI difference between CFO and CEO, as well as 
between CFO and the board, which is defined as the absolute difference between their UAI scores; 2) the 
cultural background distance between CFO and CEO, as well as between CFO and the board, which is defined 
following Aybar and Ficici’s (2009) method. Specifically, we first calculate the absolute difference between 
CFO and the CEO/board for four cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance, individualism, 
and masculinity). We then calculate the average ranking of each dimension divided by the number of 
observations in order to capture culture distance. Regression results are presented in Table A2 in the Online 
Appendix.
  
19
important role than CEOs in finance-related decisions is consistent with Kim et al. (2011) and 
Florackis and Sainani (2018).
[Insert Table 4 here]
4.4. Endogeneity
While the OLS regression assumes that the presence of a CFO with a specific cultural 
background is exogenous, we are concerned that it may be endogenous and influenced by the 
omission of relevant variables or a selection bias. For example, a CFO with a stronger UAI 
may be attractive to various firms. To address this concern, we first employ firm-fixed effects. 
The application of firm-fixed effects controls to some extent for any unobserved, time-
invariant firm-specific factors. It also allows us to test our first hypothesis via within-firm 
variation, e.g., when firms experience a CFO turnover between individuals with different 
uncertainty avoidance tendencies. The results are in Table 5, panel A, and suggest that the 
effect of  on price crash risk remains significant after controlling for firm-fixed 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
effects.6
[Insert Table 5 here]
Second, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) specification that uses a CFO 
turnover event. Specifically, we compare firms that are influenced by turnover events with a 
change in CFO UAI (the treatment group) with those without such changes (the control 
group). We then examine the effect of CFO turnover events. In addition, since we investigate 
how crash risk changes from the periods before CFO turnover to the periods afterward, we 
are able to control for time-invariant unobservable firm effects. Hence, we can rule out 
alternative explanations if no other change, independent of the CFO turnover, occurred within 
the firm at the same time. Note that, although the DID specification enjoys the above 
6 It is possible that CFOs may be “sticky” to firms. In such cases, the firm-fixed effects will absorb the time-
invariant CFO-level characteristics. Hence, CFO stickiness will not affect our inferences, because we still find 
significant results.
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identification advantages, some limitations remain, such as a lower number of observations 
(i.e., only turnover-related firm-years are included), and a lower variation in our variable of 
interest (i.e., we convert our continuous  variable into dummy variables that capture 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
whether an incoming CFO has stronger or weaker UAI). The DID and firm-fixed effects 
model therefore complement each other. 
Following Huang and Kisgen (2013), we then reconstruct our sample and turnover 
indicators to mitigate any potential measurement errors. First, we limit our sample to the 
three years before and after a CFO turnover, excluding the transition year. Second, we require 
firm have at least two years’ of available data before the CFO turnover. Third, we require that 
a new CFO be in power for at least two years after the turnover year. The final sample 
consists of 614 turnovers, of which 33 involved an incumbent CFO being replaced by a new 
CFO with a stronger UAI, and 20 involved being replaced by a new CFO with a weaker UAI. 
Our difference-in-differences regression model is:
𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽2 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐾∑
𝑘 = 1𝛾𝑘 × 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ‒ 1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (6)
where  is an indicator that equals 1 if the observation is a post-turnover event, and 0 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡
otherwise,  equals 1 if an incoming CFO has a weaker UAI, and 0 otherwise, 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡
and  equals 1 if an incoming CFO has a stronger UAI, and 0 otherwise. We also 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝑃𝑖,𝑡
control for firm- and year-fixed effects. 
Table 5, panel B, presents corresponding results. We find that the coefficients of the 
interaction term  are positively but insignificantly associated with 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖,𝑡
crash risk, while the coefficients of  are negatively and significantly 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝑃𝑖,𝑡
associated with crash risk. This indicates that a new CEO with a stronger UAI will reduce 
firm stock price crash risk. The results are, in general, consistent with our main inferences.
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Finally, we complement the above two tests by using the propensity score matching 
approach. The purpose is to match a set of control firms (firms that retain CFOs with median 
to low UAI) to a set of treatment firms (firms that retain CFOs with above-median UAI), so 
that the two sets are statistically alike in terms of other relevant factors. The propensity 
method therefore allows us to identify the treatment effect on firms. We capture the treatment 
firms by using an indicator variable (i.e., ) that equals 1 if the firms retain CFOs  𝐻𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
with above-industry median UAIs, and 0 otherwise. Because most of the CFOs are British, 
median UAI is the British UAI,7 and we only identify 268 firm-years as treated firms.8
Propensity score matching proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we estimate a logit 
model to determine the propensity score. The covariates used to predict the probability of 
treated firms ( ) are consistent with the control variables used in the baseline 𝐻𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
results in Table 3. An untabulated logit regression suggests that most of the firm-level 
covariates predict the probability of treated firms (i.e., , , , , , 𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝑅𝐸𝑇 𝑅𝐸𝑇  ∆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑀/𝐵
). This finding confirms that the presence of CFOs with strong UAI is endogenous to 𝐿𝐸𝑉
these observable covariates.9 
In the second step, we match firms by using a nearest neighbour algorithm with 
caliper 0.01 and no replacement, and we restrict the observations to only those within the 
common support. We identify 256 pairs in total. We then re-estimate our baseline regression 
model using a paired sample. The sample variation dramatically decreases because of both 
the limited observations of CFOs with above-median UAI, and the transformation of UAI 
from continuous values (ranging from 0.08 for Singapore to 0.86 for France) to an indicator 
7 Because of the cross-industry heterogeneity, we apply an industry median as a benchmark to determine 𝐻𝐶𝐹𝑂_
. Untabulated results show our results remain robust if we use the sample median instead.𝑈𝐴𝐼
8 The treatment firms are those with CFOs from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Netherlands, France, Germany, India, 
Israel, Italy, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, and the U.S.
9 Due to space limitations, we do not report the logit regression for the first step of the propensity score 
matching approach. However, the results are available upon request.
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value (0 and 1). Nevertheless, Table 5, panel C, reveals a marginally significant and negative 
relation between CFO UAI and  and .𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊
Collectively, the results from firm-fixed effects regressions, the difference-in-
differences specification, and propensity score matching estimators are consistent with our 
baseline results. Therefore, the negative effect of  on future stock price crash risk is 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
robust after controlling for correlated omitted variables and selection bias.
4.5. Additional analyses
In this section, we explore the potential channels through which CFO uncertainty 
avoidance background affects future stock price crash risk.
4.5.1. The effect of information asymmetry
First, we investigate whether the negative relationship between CFO uncertainty 
avoidance and future stock price crash risk is affected by the level of a firm’s asymmetric 
information. The agency theoretic framework suggests that crash risk results from managerial 
bad news hoarding behaviours (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009). The uncertainty 
avoidance culture influences individuals’ ambiguity preferences (Chui and Kwok, 2008). 
Given these notions, we expect that managers’ abilities and incentives to hoard bad news will 
be stronger in firms with higher information asymmetry. 
Empirically, we divide our sample into two groups based on four different measures 
to gauge the level of information asymmetry. First, we use number of analysts following, 
, as a proxy for the strength of a firm’s external monitoring. A higher 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
number of analysts following indicates stronger external monitoring. Yu (2008) documents 
that firms with higher levels of analyst following tend to engage in less opportunistic earnings 
management, indicating that managerial discretionary behaviour is constrained by stronger 
external monitoring. Accordingly, we expect that the negative effect of CFO UAI on price 
crash risk will be stronger for firms with a weaker external monitoring environment. The 
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subsample results are in Table 6, panel A. We find that the negative effect of CFO UAI is 
more significant for firms with a lower number of analysts following, consistent with our 
expectation.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Second, we use bid-ask spreads as a proxy for the quality of a firm’s information 
environment.  is the annual average spread calculated using the daily ratio 𝐵𝑖𝑑 ‒ 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑
of the difference between the ask and bid prices to the midpoint of the ask and bid prices. A 
higher bid-ask spread indicates a lower level of information environment quality. Jayaraman 
(2008) suggests that higher bid-ask spreads could be due to higher levels of informed trading. 
We expect that the effect of CFO UAI will be stronger for firms with lower levels of 
information environment quality. The results are in Table 6, panel B. We find that the 
negative effect of CFO UAI on price crash risk is stronger for firms with higher bid-ask 
spreads, consistent with our expectation.
Third, we use financial statement comparability as a proxy for the quantity and quality 
of a firm’s information.  denotes firm-level 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
comparability as developed by De Franco et al. (2011). It is calculated as the average of the 
four highest comparability scores for all -  firm pairs in the same industry during period .10 𝑖 𝑗 𝑡
Prior literature suggests that comparability lowers the cost of acquiring and processing 
information and enhances the quality of information available to investors (De Franco et al., 
2011; Kim et al., 2016a). We expect the effect of CFO UAI to be stronger when firms’ 
financial statements are less comparable. The results are in Table 6, panel C. We find that the 
effect of CFO UAI is more pronounced for firms with lower financial statement 
comparability, consistent with our expectation. 
10 Untabulated results show that our inferences are robust to an alternative financial statement comparability 
measurement, which is calculated as the median of the comparability scores for all -  firm pairs in the same 𝑖 𝑗
industry during period .𝑡
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Overall, the results in Table 6 are consistent with our expectation that the effect of 
CFO UAI is stronger among firms with a higher level of information asymmetry. 
4.5.2. The effect of firm risk
Second, we investigate whether the negative association between CFO uncertainty 
avoidance and future stock price crash risk is affected by the riskiness of the firm. Prior 
literature argues that the culture of uncertainty avoidance influences individual risk 
preferences. That is, CFOs with stronger UAI may be more risk averse and follow more 
conservative corporate policies with less risky projects, resulting in less bad news to hoard. 
Accordingly, we expect that managers’ risk aversion due to a strong uncertainty avoidance 
background will be stronger in firms with more risk-taking activities (i.e., riskier firms). 
Empirically, we divide our sample into two groups based on four measures to proxy 
for firm riskiness:  is the standard deviation of quarterly cash flows 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
from operations over the sixteen quarters scaled by total debt (Graham et al., 2008); 
 is the standard deviation of the past eight earnings changes scaled by 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
the average book asset over the past eight quarters (Valta, 2012);  is 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
annualised volatility calculated using monthly stock returns from the previous year (Bharath 
and Shumway, 2008; Brogaard et al., 2017); and  is the 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
probability that the value of a firm’s assets will be less than the face value of its debt (Bharath 
and Shumway, 2008; Brogaard et al., 2017). 
The results are in Table 7, panels A-D. We find strong evidence that the effect of CFO 
UAI is more pronounced for firms with higher levels of cash flow volatility, earnings 
volatility, return volatility, and expected default frequency. Collectively, the results in Table 
7 are consistent with our expectation that the effect of CFO UAI is stronger for firms with 
higher levels of riskiness.
[Insert Table 7 here]
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4.6. Robustness Tests
4.6.1. The effect of CFO influence
In this subsection, to further confirm the important role of CFO cultural background 
in affecting corporate decision and outcomes, we explore whether the negative association 
between CFO uncertainty avoidance and future stock price crash risk is affected by the level 
of influence of CFOs on firm decision-making. The underlying premise is that executives can 
only affect firm outcomes when they have a solid influence on firm decisions (Adams et al., 
2005). Specifically, we test two measurements of CFOs’ ability to influence firm decisions: 
CFO seniority, and CFO relative pay. 
First, we examine whether the effect of CFO UAI on price crash risk is subject to 
CFO seniority. In order to affect a firm’s financial strategy and financial information 
disclosure, CFOs must have sufficient capabilities, experiences, and confidence. Professional 
skills accumulate over time, and these skills are more likely to be better developed in senior 
CFOs (Florackis and Sainani, 2018). In other words, CFO seniority is closely related to CFOs’ 
level of professional skills, and it also captures how a CFO can affect a firm’s financial 
strategy and information disclosure. Therefore, we expect that the effect of CFO UAI will be 
stronger when CFOs are more senior. 
We separate our sample into two subsamples based on CFO age, and test how CFO 
seniority interacts with CFO UAI. The results are in Table 8, panel A. We find that the 
coefficients on CFO UAI on price crash risk are significant, with higher economic magnitude, 
only in firms with more senior CFOs. This is consistent with our expectation.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Second, we examine whether the effect of CFO UAI on price crash risk is subject to 
CFO relative pay. As suggested in Finkelstein (1992), a manager’s compensation is an 
important measure of influence within a firm. Thus, more highly paid CFOs are expected to 
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have a more significant effect on corporate decisions. To capture the potential influence of a 
CFO on corporate financial strategy, we use CFO relative pay, which is defined as the ratio of 
the CFO’s total compensation, excluding equity-based awards, to the CEO’s total 
compensation. If CFO relative pay is higher, we expect that the CFO uncertainty avoidance 
tendency will be more likely to influence a firm’s financial reporting decisions, and, therefore, 
the stock price crash risk. 
We divide our sample into two groups based on CFO relative pay. The results are in 
Table 8, panel B. We find that the negative effect of CFO UAI on price crash risk is stronger 
when CFO relative pay is higher, especially for  and , which is consistent 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊
with our expectation. Taken together, the above analyses indicate that the effect of CFO UAI 
on stock price crash risk is particularly important when CFOs are likely to have a greater 
influence on firm decisions.
4.6.2. Additional controls
At last, to further ensure robustness, we re-estimate our main regression models with 
a full set of control variables, and then control for additional factors.11 First, we consider 
other executive characteristics, including age, tenure, and gender of CEOs and CFOs. 
Andreou et al. (2017) document that firms with younger CEOs are more likely to experience 
stock price crash risk, since CEOs have more incentives to hoard bad news in their earlier 
careers. The relevant results are presented in Table 9, panel A. 
[Insert Table 9 here]
Second, we consider financial reporting quality. Hutton et al. (2009) find that the 
transparency of financial statements affects stock price crashes. This is because higher 
financial reporting quality can help reduce information asymmetry. Specifically, they find a 
non-linear effect of financial reporting opacity on crash risk. Kim and Zhang (2016) also 
11 The number of sample observations varies depending on the data availability of additional controls.
  
27
document that conditional conservatism can reduce managers’ incentives and ability to hide 
bad news. It is therefore associated with a lower crash risk. Thus, we control for accounting 
quality by including  and its square, as well as a conservatism score, in addition to 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸
our main results.12 The relevant results are in Table 9, panel B.
Third, we consider corporate governance characteristics. Higher corporate governance 
quality reflects more effective monitoring over executives. Because high governance quality 
may prevent executives from hoarding bad news, it leads to a limited effect of CFOs on 
future crash risk. Therefore, we investigate whether corporate governance quality affects the 
influence of CFO UAI on stock price crash risk. We use three proxies for corporate 
governance characteristics: board size, CEO-chairman duality, and non-executive director 
ratio (i.e., proportion of independent directors). The relevant results are in Table 9, panel C. 
Fourth, we consider CFO equity incentives. Equity incentives may induce managerial 
short-termism, such as bad news hoarding, by inflating short-term stock prices (Bolton et al., 
2006; Benmelech et al., 2010). Kim et al. (2011) find that executives’ (especially CFOs’) 
equity incentives significantly affect crash risk. Therefore, we control for CFO equity 
incentives, which are measured as the ratio of equity-based incentives over total 
compensation.13 The relevant results are in Table 9, panel D.
Fifth, we consider Hofstede’s other cultural dimensions, besides uncertainty 
avoidance. These include power distance,  (the extent to which less powerful members of 𝑃𝐷𝐼
organisations and institutions accept and expect power to be distributed unequally), 
individualism,  (the extent to which people feel independent, as opposed to being 𝐼𝐷𝑉
interdependent members of larger wholes), and masculinity,  (the extent to which the use 𝑀𝐴𝑆
12 Our primary measure for opacity captures performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, as developed by 
Kothari et al. (2005). Our results are not sensitive if we measure discretionary accruals with a modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995) (as shown in Table A3 in the Online Appendix).
13 We also consider an alternative CFO equity incentives measurement: the natural logarithm of equity-based 
compensation. Corresponding results are presented in Table A4 in the Online Appendix, and show that our 
inferences are robust to this alternative measure.
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of force is endorsed socially). Previous literature finds that other cultural dimensions, 
especially individualism, are also pertinent for information disclosure and financial outcomes. 
For example, Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) find that individualism is negatively related to 
accounting conservatism, and positively related to risk-taking in the banking industry. An et 
al. (2018) and Dang et al. (2018) find that firms located in countries with higher levels of 
individualism have higher stock price crash risk. Jakob and Nam (2017) show that higher 
masculinity and individualism are significantly associated with less negative abnormal 
market reactions prior to official sovereign debt rating downgrade announcements. The 
relevant results are in Table 9, panel E.14
Sixth, we consider firm-level internationalisation. As it increases, the level of 
complexity and monitoring difficulty also increase. This leads to higher asymmetric 
information and agency problems. Boehme and May (2016) find that multinational firms are 
more likely to crash. Hence, we include two proxies for firm internationalisation: percentage 
of foreign sales, and percentage of foreign directors.15 The relevant results are in Table 9, 
panel F.
Seventh, we consider whether our finding on the effect of CFO UAI is driven by a 
specific group of CFOs. Table 1 shows that U.S. CFOs make up the third-highest proportion, 
after U.K. and Irish CFOs. We therefore test whether our results hold by including a dummy 
14 We note that  is highly correlated with  (0.662),  (-0.394), and (-0.588) 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑃𝐷𝐼 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐼𝐷𝑉 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝑆 
(as shown in Table A5 in the Online Appendix). High correlations may cause multicollinearity in our analysis. 
We therefore test the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of these cultural dimensions to check for multicollinearity. 
The VIFs are low, and below the threshold of 10 (Hair et al., 2009), indicating that multicollinearity is unlikely 
to be a major concern in our regressions. In addition, we orthogonalize  by regressing  on the 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
other cultural dimensions (i.e., , , ) and taking the residual ( ). 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑃𝐷𝐼 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐼𝐷𝑉 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝑆 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼_𝑅𝐸
 captures the component of UAI that cannot be explained by the other Hofstede cultural 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼_𝑅𝐸
dimensions. We re-estimate our baseline modules and find that our main inferences hold. Details for 
corresponding results are shown in Table A6 in the Online Appendix.
15 Our results are also robust when using alternative measures of firm internationalisation, including percentage 
of foreign assets, percentage of foreign income, and number of geographic segments (international 
diversification). Corresponding results are available upon request.
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variable, , which equals 1 if a CFO’s nationality is American, and 0 otherwise. The 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝑆𝐴
results are in Table 9, panel G.
Last, we consider the effect of foreignness. One could argue that the CFO effect is 
due purely to foreignness rather than to cultural background. We therefore test whether our 
results hold when we include a dummy variable that equals 1 if a CFO is not British, and 0 
otherwise. The relevant results are in Table 9, panel H. 
Based on Table 9, we find that  continues to have a significant effect even 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
after considering these additional variables. This provides further confirmation of the 
robustness of our main results.
 5. Conclusion
This paper investigates the relation between the cultural background of CFOs and the 
risk of future stock price crashes. Consistent with the conjecture that individuals with strong 
UAI prefer certainty over ambiguity, we find that firms with CFOs who have stronger UAI 
experience lower future stock price crash risk. This significant and negative impact 
dominates even the effect of CEOs’ and the board’s UAI. The results are robust to controlling 
for potential endogeneity by applying firm-fixed effect regressions, a difference-in-
differences specification, and a propensity score matching procedure. Additional analyses 
further suggest that the effect of CFO UAI is stronger when firms have higher information 
asymmetry, and when firms are riskier. Finally, robustness tests highlight that the role of 
CFO UAI is more pronounced when the CFO is more likely to strongly influence firm 
decisions. We also find that the effect of CFO UAI on stock price crash risk remains after 
controlling for other executive characteristics (i.e., age, tenure, and gender), financial 
reporting quality, corporate governance quality, CFO equity incentives, other cultural 
dimensions (i.e., power distance, individualism, and masculinity), and foreignness of CFOs.
  
30
This paper provides valuable implications for both scholars and practitioners. First, in 
addition to firm fundamental features, we suggest that managerial cultural background 
provides capital market participants with subtle but important information in evaluating firms 
and making investment decisions. More importantly, we find that cultural dimension affects 
not only managerial behaviour across countries, as suggested by prior literature, but also 
managers with different backgrounds but who work in the same country. Second, this paper 
highlights the importance of linking specific executives to specific firm aspects. In particular, 
we highlight the importance of CFOs in affecting corporate extreme downside risk, which is 
an outcome of high importance to capital market participants. 
In summary, this paper presents consistent results that CFO cultural background, 
especially the uncertainty avoidance tendency, has a significant influence on firm decisions 
and outcomes. By going beyond the effect of CEO and board characteristics examined in 
prior research, this study encourages capital market participants to also consider vital CFO 
characteristics when making investment decisions.
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Appendix A: Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Dependent variables: Price crash risk measures
𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 The difference between the number of firm-specific weekly returns 
exceeding 3.20 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific 
weekly return over the fiscal year, and the number of firm-specific 
weekly returns exceeding 3.20 standard deviations above the mean 
firm-specific weekly return.
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊 The negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns during the 
fiscal year period.
𝐷𝑈𝑂𝑉𝐿 The natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation of firm-
specific weekly returns for down-weeks to that for up-weeks. For a 
firm over a fiscal year period, down-weeks are defined as all weeks 
with firm-specific weekly returns below the annual mean, and up-
weeks are all weeks with firm-specific weekly returns above the 
annual mean.
Test variables: CFO cultural background
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 Country-level Hofstede uncertainty avoidance index according to 
CFO nationality.
Control variables
∆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 The change in average monthly stock turnover compared to the 
previous fiscal year. Monthly stock turnover is defined as the ratio 
of monthly trading volume to average number of shares 
outstanding.
𝑅𝐸𝑇 The mean of firm-specific weekly returns during one fiscal year.
𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝑅𝐸𝑇 The standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns during one 
fiscal year.
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 The natural logarithm of a firm’s market capitalisation at the end of 
one fiscal year.
𝑀/𝐵 The ratio of the market value of equity to book value.
𝐿𝐸𝑉 The ratio of long-term debt to total assets.
𝑅𝑂𝐴 The return on assets, which is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to closing total assets.
Additional control variables
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 Country-level Hofstede uncertainty avoidance index according to 
CEO nationality.
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑈𝐴𝐼 The average UAI of board members, excluding the CEO and the CFO.
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐴𝐺𝐸 Age of CEO.
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 Tenure of CEO.
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅 An indicator variable that equals 1 if a CEO is female, and 0 
otherwise.
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐴𝐺𝐸 Age of CFO.
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 Tenure of CFO.
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅 An indicator variable that equals 1 if a CFO is female, and 0 
otherwise.
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𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸 The previous three years’ moving sum of the absolute value of 
annual performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, where the 
discretionary accruals are estimated following Kothari et al. (2005).
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸2 The square of .𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸
𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 The conservatism score estimated following Khan and Watts 
(2009).
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 The total number of directors on a firm’s board.
𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO is the chairman, and 
0 otherwise.
𝑁𝐸𝐷_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 The proportion of non-executive directors.
𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 The ratio of equity-based incentives over total compensation.
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑃𝐷𝐼 Country-level Hofstede power distance index according to CFO 
nationality.
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐼𝐷𝑉 Country-level Hofstede individualism index according to CFO 
nationality.
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝑆 Country-level Hofstede masculinity index according to CFO 
nationality.
𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 The percentage of foreign sales of a firm.
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 The percentage of non-British directors on a firm’s board.
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝑆𝐴 An indicator variable that equals 1 if a CFO is American, and 0 
otherwise.
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 An indicator variable that equals 1 if a CFO is not British, and 0 
otherwise.
  
37
Figure 1. CFO turnover and stock price crash risk
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Panel A: CFO replaced by an individual with stronger UAI
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Notes: Figure 1 presents the average price crash risk around the CFO turnover event. The sample consists of 
firm year observations three years pre- and post CFO turnover event, excluding the event year. For both Panel A 
and Panel B, the vertical axis represents three different measures of price crash risk, whereas the horizontal axis 
represents the corresponding average values of price crash risk. 
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Table 1. CFO nationality distribution
Nationality Freq. Percent Cum. UAI
American 97 1.53 1.53 0.46
Australian 35 0.55 2.08 0.51
Brazilian 2 0.03 2.11 0.76
British 5,925 93.29 95.4 0.35
Canadian 6 0.09 95.5 0.48
Dutch 11 0.17 95.67 0.53
French 40 0.63 96.3 0.86
German 1 0.02 96.32 0.65
Indian 1 0.02 96.33 0.40
Irish 151 2.38 98.71 0.35
Israeli 2 0.03 98.74 0.81
Italian 1 0.02 98.76 0.75
Malaysian 3 0.05 98.8 0.36
New Zealander 14 0.22 99.02 0.49
Norwegian 4 0.06 99.09 0.50
Singaporean 2 0.03 99.12 0.08
South African 49 0.77 99.89 0.49
Swedish 5 0.08 99.97 0.29
Swiss 2 0.03 100 0.58
Total 6,351 100
Notes: Table 1 presents the distribution of CFO nationality, including frequency, percentage, and UAI, for FTSE 
All-Share firms from 1999 to 2015.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Number Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75
𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 6351 -0.049 0.639 0.000 0.000 0.000
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊 6351 -0.048 0.853 -0.518 -0.090 0.351
𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿 6351 -0.057 0.559 -0.414 -0.074 0.279
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 6351 0.358 0.049 0.350 0.350 0.350
𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝑅𝐸𝑇 6351 0.044 0.024 0.028 0.037 0.053
𝑅𝐸𝑇 6351 -0.122 0.149 -0.138 -0.069 -0.037
∆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 6351 0.000 0.037 -0.015 0.000 0.014
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 6351 13.020 1.928 11.677 12.889 14.250
𝑀/𝐵 6351 2.656 3.931 1.110 1.900 3.240
𝐿𝐸𝑉 6351 0.163 0.162 0.009 0.130 0.262
𝑅𝑂𝐴 6351 0.045 0.111 0.018 0.057 0.095
Panel B: Correlation Matrix
𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊 𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝑅𝐸𝑇 𝑅𝐸𝑇 ∆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑀/𝐵 𝐿𝐸𝑉
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊 0.790
𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿 0.651 0.901
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼 -0.006 -0.002 0.002
𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝑅𝐸𝑇 0.066 0.134 0.122 -0.007
𝑅𝐸𝑇 -0.066 -0.126 -0.115 0.008 -0.966
∆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁 0.033 0.060 0.039 -0.003 0.043 -0.040
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 0.061 0.055 0.072 0.127 -0.493 0.422 0.014
𝑀/𝐵 -0.039 -0.067 -0.078 0.020 -0.109 0.090 0.005 0.168
𝐿𝐸𝑉 0.021 0.028 0.044 0.004 -0.051 0.018 0.016 0.192 -0.029
𝑅𝑂𝐴 -0.061 -0.093 -0.096 0.034 -0.451 0.456 0.001 0.294 0.158 0.008
Notes: Table 2 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics and Table 2 Panel B presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between any two key variables (values in bold are 
significant at a 1% level). Definitions of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. Continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile.
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Table 3. CFO Cultural Background and Stock Price Crash Risk
𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻 𝑵𝑪𝑺𝑲𝑬𝑾 𝑫𝑼𝑽𝑶𝑳
(1) (2) (3)
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.329** -0.504*** -0.350***
(-2.51) (-2.85) (-3.12)
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 ‒ 1 0.023** 0.020 0.012
(2.15) (1.31) (1.29)
𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 ‒ 1 4.221*** 6.307*** 3.256**
(2.60) (2.93) (2.44)
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 ‒ 1 0.694*** 0.862*** 0.387**
(2.99) (2.76) (2.03)
∆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 ‒ 1 0.068 0.166 -0.015
(0.30) (0.57) (-0.08)
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 ‒ 1 0.051*** 0.084*** 0.063***
(8.74) (9.93) (11.79)
𝑀/𝐵𝑡 ‒ 1 0.003 0.006** 0.003**
(1.42) (2.09) (2.09)
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 ‒ 1 0.023 0.044 0.041
(0.39) (0.54) (0.77)
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.011 -0.037 -0.020
(-0.12) (-0.30) (-0.25)
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 -0.582*** -1.537*** -1.280***
(-5.09) (-9.53) (-12.47)
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.04 0.06
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents regression results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-Share firms 
from 1999 to 2015. Definitions of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. Continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. 
*, ** and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4. CFO UAI and Price Crash Risk: Controlling for CEO and Board UAI
𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻 𝑵𝑪𝑺𝑲𝑬𝑾 𝑫𝑼𝑽𝑶𝑳
(1) (2) (3)
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.316** -0.454** -0.297**
(-2.30) (-2.44) (-2.47)
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.029 0.003 -0.020
(-0.27) (0.02) (-0.23)
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.035 -0.390 -0.362*
(-0.14) (-1.29) (-1.88)
𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑡 ‒ 1 0.024** 0.021 0.013
(2.19) (1.38) (1.36)
𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 ‒ 1 4.220*** 6.330*** 3.306**
(2.61) (2.95) (2.48)
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 ‒ 1 0.695*** 0.865*** 0.391**
(2.99) (2.77) (2.05)
∆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 ‒ 1 0.068 0.165 -0.018
(0.30) (0.56) (-0.10)
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 ‒ 1 0.051*** 0.087*** 0.066***
(8.10) (9.57) (11.36)
𝑀/𝐵𝑡 ‒ 1 0.003 0.006** 0.003**
(1.42) (2.06) (2.03)
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡 ‒ 1 0.022 0.042 0.039
(0.38) (0.51) (0.74)
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.012 -0.045 -0.028
(-0.13) (-0.36) (-0.35)
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 -0.464*** -1.197*** -1.019***
(-3.66) (-6.87) (-9.20)
No. of Obs 6350 6350 6350
Adj. 𝑅2 0.04 0.06 0.07
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents regression results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-Share firms 
from 1999 to 2015, controlling for CEO and board UAI. Definitions of the key variables are provided in the 
Appendix A. Continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. T-statistics reported in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *, ** and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.
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Table 5. CFO UAI and Price Crash Risk: Controlling for Endogeneity
𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻 𝑵𝑪𝑺𝑲𝑬𝑾 𝑫𝑼𝑽𝑶𝑳
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Firm-fixed effects
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.537** -0.537** -0.399***
(-2.06) (-2.16) (-2.72)
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.06 0.07
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Difference-in-differences
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 -0.006 -0.078* -0.029
(-0.19) (-1.89) (-1.03)
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 × 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 0.120 0.196 0.183
(0.97) (1.32) (1.64)
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 × 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝑃 -0.152* -0.172* -0.110*
(-1.79) (-1.77) (-1.67)
No. of Obs 2602 2602 2602
Adj. 𝑅2 0.05 0.08 0.08
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Propensity score matching
𝐻𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.094* -0.117* -0.063
(-1.84) (-1.90) (-1.55)
No. of Obs 512 512 512
Adj. 𝑅2 0.02 0.01 0.05
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents the results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-Share firms from 
1999 to 2015 using firm-fixed effect regressions (Panel A), difference-in-differences specification (Panel B), 
and propensity score matching approaches (Panel C). A full set of controls are included, but are not reported for 
simplicity (available upon request).  is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the firm-year is post-𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇
turnover event, and 0 otherwise.  is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the incoming CFO has 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝑃
stronger UAI than the incumbent CFO, and 0 otherwise.  is an indicator variable which is equal to 𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁
1 if the incoming CFO has weaker UAI than the incumbent CFO, and 0 otherwise.  is an indicator 𝐻𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼
variable which is equal to 1 if the firms retain CFOs with above industry median UAI, and 0 otherwise. 
Definitions of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. Continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st 
and 99th percentile. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *, ** and *** stand 
for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6. Subsample Analyses: Information Asymmetry
𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻 𝑵𝑪𝑺𝑲𝑬𝑾 𝑵𝑪𝑺𝑲𝑬𝑾 𝑫𝑼𝑽𝑶𝑳 𝑫𝑼𝑽𝑶𝑳
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Analyst coverage
High Low High Low High Low
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.081 -0.634*** -0.047 -0.803*** -0.138 -0.442**
(-0.50) (-2.86) (-0.23) (-2.66) (-1.17) (-2.08)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 2919 3432 2919 3432 2919 3432
Adj. 𝑅2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05
Panel B: Bid-ask spread
High Low High Low High Low
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.585** -0.177 -0.912*** -0.226 -0.646*** -0.168
(-2.17) (-1.27) (-2.65) (-1.22) (-3.07) (-1.32)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 3238 3108 3238 3108 3238 3108
Adj. 𝑅2 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02
Panel C: Financial statement comparability
High Low High Low High Low
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 0.047 -0.481** -0.192 -0.787*** -0.214 -0.613***
(0.30) (-1.97) (-0.63) (-2.95) (-1.17) (-3.77)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 2071 2041 2071 2041 2071 2041
Adj. 𝑅2 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06
Notes: This table presents subsample regression results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-
Share firms from 1999 to 2015, focusing on information asymmetry.  is the number of 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
analysts following.  is the annual average bid-ask spread calculated using daily ratio of the 𝐵𝑖𝑑 ‒ 𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑
difference between ask price and bid price to the midpoint of ask price and bid price. 
 is the firm-level financial statement comparability calculated as the 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
average of the four highest comparability scores for all -  firm pairs in the same industry during period . 𝑖 𝑗 𝑡
 is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.  is the ratio of 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
the number of independent directors to the total number of directors on the board. Definitions of the key 
variables are provided in the Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *, ** and *** stand for significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 7. Subsample Analyses: Firm Risk
𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻 𝑵𝑪𝑺𝑲𝑬𝑾 𝑵𝑪𝑺𝑲𝑬𝑾 𝑫𝑼𝑽𝑶𝑳 𝑫𝑼𝑽𝑶𝑳
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Cash flow volatility
High Low High Low High Low
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.521*** -0.178 -0.844*** -0.222 -0.455** -0.184
(-3.06) (-0.97) (-2.88) (-0.93) (-2.21) (-1.32)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 2912 2889 2912 2889 2912 2889
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
Panel B: Earnings volatility
High Low High Low High Low
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.320 -0.235 -0.577** -0.357 -0.427** -0.197
(-1.52) (-0.99) (-2.09) (-1.04) (-2.42) (-0.96)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 3157 3162 3157 3162 3157 3162
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06
Panel C: Return volatility
High Low High Low High Low
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.504** -0.208 -0.792*** -0.259 -0.588*** -0.158
(-2.23) (-1.14) (-3.05) (-1.20) (-3.27) (-1.29)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 3235 3111 3235 3111 3235 3111
Adj. 𝑅2 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05
Panel D: Expected default frequency
High Low High Low High Low
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.415* -0.253 -0.678* -0.351 -0.376 -0.367**
(-1.69) (-1.28) (-1.93) (-1.37) (-1.51) (-2.55)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 2919 2536 2919 2536 2919 2536
Adj. 𝑅2 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05
Notes: This table presents subsample regression results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-
Share firms from 1999 to 2015, focusing on firm risk.  is the standard deviation of 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
quarterly cash flows from operations over the 16 quarters scaled by total debt.  is the 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
standard deviation of past eight earnings changes scaled by the average book asset over the past eight quarters. 
 is the annualised volatility calculated using monthly stock returns from the previous year. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 is the probability that the value of a firm’s assets will be less than the face value 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
of its debt. Definitions of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. 
*, ** and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 8. Subsample Analyses: CFO Influence
𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻 𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻 𝑵𝑪𝑺𝑲𝑬𝑾 𝑵𝑪𝑺𝑲𝑬𝑾 𝑫𝑼𝑽𝑶𝑳 𝑫𝑼𝑽𝑶𝑳
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: CFO age
High Low High Low High Low
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.357** -0.355* -0.659*** -0.366 -0.516*** -0.231
(-2.38) (-1.65) (-2.72) (-1.63) (-3.75) (-1.43)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 2903 3448 2903 3448 2903 3448
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
Panel B: CFO relative pay
High Low High Low High Low
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.734*** 0.144 -0.873** 0.068 -0.430 -0.136
(-2.76) (0.92) (-2.42) (0.33) (-1.59) (-1.03)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs 3096 3158 3096 3158 3096 3158
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06
Notes: This table presents subsample regression results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-
Share firms from 1999 to 2015, focusing on CFO influence.  is the age of CFO.  is 𝐶𝐹𝑂 age 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦
the ratio of the CFO’s total compensation excluding equity-based awards to the CEO’s total compensation. 
Definitions of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 
1st and 99th percentile. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *, ** and *** 
stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9. CFO UAI and Price Crash Risk: Controlling for Additional Controls
𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻 𝑵𝑪𝑺𝑲𝑬𝑾 𝑫𝑼𝑽𝑶𝑳
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Controlling for other executive characteristics
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.349** -0.494*** -0.341***
(-2.49) (-2.61) (-2.69)
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 ‒ 1 0.006 -0.041 0.013
(0.10) (-0.48) (0.24)
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.005 -0.021** -0.017***
(-0.58) (-2.01) (-2.63)
𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.044 -0.096 -0.032
(-0.56) (-0.96) (-0.50)
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.14) (-0.52) (-0.48)
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(-0.62) (-0.25) (-0.07)
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.031 -0.064 -0.054*
(-0.82) (-1.32) (-1.71)
No. of Obs 6240 6240 6240
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.04 0.06
Panel B: Controlling for financial reporting quality
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.238* -0.462** -0.355***
(-1.81) (-2.58) (-3.16)
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸𝑡 ‒ 1 0.146 0.214 0.044
(0.85) (0.85) (0.27)
𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸 2𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.012 0.090 0.264
(-0.05) (0.23) (0.99)
𝐶_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.050 0.017 0.031
(-1.17) (0.28) (0.79)
No. of Obs 5217 5217 5217
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.04 0.06
Panel C: Controlling for corporate governance characteristics
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.322** -0.488*** -0.346***
(-2.46) (-2.78) (-3.12)
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 ‒ 1 0.000 -0.020 -0.015
(0.01) (-0.39) (-0.44)
𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.008 0.016 -0.001
(-0.39) (0.62) (-0.04)
𝑁𝐸𝐷_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑡 ‒ 1 0.065 0.055 0.018
(1.03) (0.65) (0.30)
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.04 0.06
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(Continued)
Panel D: Controlling for the CFO equity incentives
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.322** -0.487*** -0.341***
(-2.43) (-2.72) (-3.01)
𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑡 ‒ 1 0.039 0.093** 0.050
(1.09) (1.97) (1.62)
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.04 0.06
Panel E: Controlling for Hofstede’s cultural dimensions
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.326 -0.564** -0.332*
(-1.62) (-2.33) (-1.94)
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.136 -0.080 -0.043
(-0.56) (-0.28) (-0.20)
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑡 ‒ 1 0.083 -0.042 0.061
(0.54) (-0.21) (0.42)
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑀𝐴𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.216 -0.190 -0.059
(-1.55) (-0.65) (-0.28)
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.04 0.06
Panel F: Controlling for the effect of internationalisation
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.263** -0.372** -0.239**
(-2.03) (-2.23) (-2.15)
𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑡 ‒ 1 0.047 0.063 0.025
(1.39) (1.37) (0.84)
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.061 -0.163** -0.129**
(-1.05) (-2.11) (-2.56)
No. of Obs 5686 5686 5686
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.04 0.06
Panel G: Controlling for the most frequent foreign CFOs
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.324** -0.505*** -0.357***
(-2.41) (-2.79) (-3.11)
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝑆𝐴𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.008 0.001 0.011
(-0.13) (0.01) (0.22)
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.04 0.06
Panel H: Controlling for the effect of CFO foreignness
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝑈𝐴𝐼𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.231 -0.401* -0.261*
(-1.44) (-1.80) (-1.75)
𝐶𝐹𝑂_𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑡 ‒ 1 -0.032 -0.034 -0.029
(-0.89) (-0.73) (-0.90)
No. of Obs 6351 6351 6351
Adj. 𝑅2 0.03 0.04 0.06
Notes: This table presents the results for CFO UAI and stock price crash risk with FTSE All-Share firms from 
1999 to 2015, controlling for additional controls. A full set of controls are included, but are not reported for 
simplicity (available upon request). Definitions of the key variables are provided in the Appendix A. Continuous 
variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust 
standard errors. *, ** and *** stand for significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Highlights:
 We explore the relationship between CFO cultural background and stock price crash risk.
 CFO with stronger uncertainty avoidance is associated with lower price crash risk.
 The effect of CFO cultural background is more pronounced for firms with higher 
information asymmetry and riskiness.
 The effect of CFO cultural background is more pronounced when CFOs have a greater 
ability to influence firm decisions.
 Our results highlight the important role of CFO in corporate financial decisions and 
outcomes.
